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ESSAY:
AT THE INTERSECTION OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
SUSTAINABILITY
JAYNE W. BARNARD∗
ABSTRACT
Most boards of public companies have learned to live comfortably
with audit committees, nominating committees, and compensation
committees. An increasing number of companies are now also creating
risk-management committees. This Essay explores the early stages of
development of yet another board-level committee: the sustainability
committee. The Essay posits several advantages to having a board-level
sustainability committee and identifies possible sources of pressure for the
creation of more such committees. It also suggests some of the
disadvantages of sustainability committees and cautions against cosmetic
governance reform. By examining what we know today (and can imagine
tomorrow) about sustainability committees, this Essay sets a baseline for
future research.
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INTRODUCTION
The norms of corporate governance derive from many sources. A wide
range of players, from state courts to institutional investors and from the
U.S. Congress to the Department of Justice, have all weighed in with,
what they claim to be, corporate governance “best practices.”1
The concept of environmental sustainability, too, derives from many
sources. Advocates of some version of the concept now range from the
United Nations to traditional environmental advocacy groups and from
multinational investment banks to interest groups like CERES.2
Companies as diverse as Wal-Mart, Nike, General Electric, and Dell
Computers have all staked a claim to leadership in sustainability
practices.3 While there may be little consensus on what we mean by the
term “sustainability,”4 more and more companies are embracing the
language, if not the substance, of the idea.
This Essay examines the small corner of the universe where corporate
governance and environmental sustainability meet.5 Though most public
1

See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 793, 794-95 (2008).
2
See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Boards and the New Environmentalism, 31 WM.
& MARY ENV. L. & POL’Y REV. 291, 293-94, 296 (2007) (tracing the involvement of
these and other groups in developing sustainability norms).
3
See id. at 300; see also Sindya N. Bhanoo, Products That Are Earth-and-Profit
Friendly, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/
business/energy-environment/12sustain.html.
4
As good a definition as any comes from Patricia Werhane: “Environmental
sustainability involves protecting the environment, preventing further harms to nature,
cleaning up pollution and other harmful emissions, conserving and recycling, maintaining
the ecosystem, improving the environment, and/or restoring the ecosystem to a former, a
pristine or pre-human condition.” Patricia H. Werhane, Note on Environmental Sustain
ability, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=908136 (last visited Feb. 24,
2011). Another, more specific description of “sustainability” is:
In its most utopian form, [sustainability] envisions a world in which all
products are made from natural materials and are 100 percent reusable,
recyclable or biodegradable, never ending up in landfills. At its most
pragmatic, it is mainly about cutting costs–by reducing waste, selling
recyclable components and reusing byproducts like rubber or plastic to
create a new product. For a large company, this can mean millions of
dollars in annual savings.
Bhanoo, supra note 3.
5
This is a largely unexplored space:
Despite the extensive body of literature available on corporate
governance and sustainability as separate areas of research, minimal
attention has been paid to the interaction between the two. In particular,
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companies “are still at the early stage of developing an integrated,
enterprise-wide sustainability program,”6 an increasing number of those
companies are involving their boards of directors in the process. The
board, of course, serves as the fulcrum between expression of an ideal and
execution by managers. The board usually achieves its goals by
distributing its work among committees.7
Some of today’s boards assign directors not only to audit committees,
nominating committees, compensation committees, and (a growing
number of) risk management committees, but also to board-level
committees tasked in whole or in part with focusing on environmental
issues.8 Nevertheless, according to The Conference Board, most public
companies “still lack the structural framework to enable proper director
oversight [of environmental activities].”9
There is a history to board involvement in environmental matters.
Early board-level committees were known, generally, as “environmental
affairs” or “environmental policy” committees.10 These committees often
were formed following a scandal, a lawsuit, or Congressional attention to
a particular industry or practice.11 Their focus was mostly on legal
compliance and the creation and oversight of monitoring programs; their
real purpose, however, was to make a convincing showing that directors
and senior management were at least aware of their companies’
environmental impact.12
Today’s environmental committees increasingly are becoming known
as “sustainability committees.”13 These committees, unlike their
predecessors, are not the offspring of scandals or lawsuits, nor are they a
there is limited knowledge of the role performed by the board of
directors in designing, endorsing, and overseeing the implementation of
a corporate sustainability program.
See Matteo Tonello, Sustainability in the Board Room, THE CONFERENCE
BOARD 1, 1-2 (2010).
6
Id. at 7.
7
Id.
8
According to the Wall Street Journal, as of 2008, 25 percent of Fortune 500 boards
had some board committee specifically addressing environmental issues. Joann S. Lublin,
Environmentalism Sprouts Up on Corporate Boards, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2008,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121840356252128043.html. A 2010 survey
by The Conference Board found that 21.6 percent of respondents assigned sustainability
issues to a dedicated board committee. Tonello, supra note 5, at 7.
9
Tonello, supra note 5, at 1.
10
See Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL.
L. REV. 959, 992 (1999) (discussing several such committees).
11
Id. at 1005-06.
12
Id. at 992.
13
See infra notes 14-20.
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response to any pressing threat of legislation.14 Rather, these committees
reflect a conscious decision to devote board-level resources to
sustainability issues, in part because sustainability practices may translate
into decreased costs and increased profits, and also in part because
sustainability issues are a growing piece of the corporate branding
equation.15
Today, sustainability committees can be found not only in extractive
industries,16 but also in service industries,17 utility companies,18 real estate
companies,19 paper manufacturers,20 plastics manufacturers,21 and various

14

There are some recent federal regulations that might foster growth of sustainability
committees. First, the SEC recently announced a requirement for enhanced disclosure on
risk management practices at the board level (for example, Regulation S-K Item 407(h)).
See N. Kathleen Friday et al., The Board’s Role in Risk Oversight: A Survey of Recent
Proxy Statement Disclosures, 24 INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR 2, 2 (2010).
Second, the SEC also recently provided guidance supporting enhanced disclosure on
climate change issues. See Commission Guidance Regarding Climate Change, 17 C.F.R.
pts. 211, 231, 241 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf.
See also Tonello, supra note 5, at 15-16 (“Experts expect the Commission’s next move
will be to officially mandate wide-ranging sustainability disclosure.”).
15
Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, supra note 10, at 992.
16
See GRYPHON-GOLD CORP., PROXY STATEMENT, available at http://www.gryphon
gold.com/main/annualreports; GOLD STAR RESOURCES, LTD., COMMITTEE CHARTER,
available at http://www.gsr.com/Investment/Corporate_Governance/CorpCommittee.asp;
CENTURY ALUMINUM CO., PROXY STATEMENT, available at http://investor.shareholder
available at
.com/cenx/annuals.cfm; ALCOA, INC., COMMITTEE CHARTER,
http://www.alcoa .com/global/en/about_alcoa/corp_gov/Public_Issues_Committee.asp;
SILVER STANDARD, INC., GOVERNANCE REPORT, available at http://www.silvers
tandard.com/company/governance/bcc/index.php?content_id=18; ALPHA NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., COMMITTEE CHARTER, available at http://www.alphanr.com/corporate
gov/committeecharters/she/Page/FullTextofSafetyHealthEnvironmentalandSustainability.aspx; WEYERHAEUSER, COMMITTEE REPORT, available at http://www.weyerhaeuser
.com /Sustainability/Directors/Responsibility.
17
See INT’L MED. STAFFING, PURE SPECTRUM LIGHTING, INC., PROXY STATEMENT,
available at http://www.psruir.com/sec-filings/.
18
See PNM RES., INC., PROXY STATEMENT, available at http://www.pnmresources
.com/investors/documentdisplay.cfm?DocumentID=5604.
19
See PROLOGIS, PROXY STATEMENT, available at http://ir.prologis.com/reports/
2008SustainabilityReport/report_guide.cfm; BOSTON PROPERTIES, INC., PROXY STATEMENT, available at http://ir.bostonproperties.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=120176&p=irolproxy.
20
See KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP., COMMITTEE CHARTER, available at http://www.kim
berly-clark.com/aboutus/sustainability.aspx.
21
See SPARTECH CORP., PROXY STATEMENT, available at http://www.spartech
.com/Spartech2009_AnnualReport.pdf.
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consumer product companies.22 Indeed, sustainability committees are
popping up all over.
Some of the companies that have created board-level sustainability
committees may, of course, be playing a public relations game. By
invoking “sustainability” rather than merely “compliance,” they may be
pouring old wine into a new bottle. On the other hand, the emergence of
sustainability committees across a range of industries may reflect a
genuine and growing commitment to at least some conception of
environmental sustainability. Only time will tell.
This Essay will unfold as follows: First, it will explore what we know
today about U.S. board-level sustainability committees.23 Then, it will
consider the values served by assigning responsibility for sustainability
issues to a board-level committee: (1) it stimulates high-level attention to
the goal(s) of sustainability; (2) it encourages competent oversight of inhouse sustainability functions; (3) it provides a focal point for resource
allocation decisions; (4) it emphasizes the notion that environmental
compliance is not a sufficient corporate goal–something more aspirational
may be appropriate; (5) it fosters education of committee members, often
leading to “missionary work” both in and outside of the corporation; and
(6) it helps in branding a corporation as a moral leader.24
The Essay will then examine the driving forces that might promote the
creation of more sustainability committees and elevate the practice from a
handful of companies to hundreds or thousands. These driving forces
include: (1) state corporate law; (2) federal securities law; (3) NYSE
listing requirements; (4) consensus-based “best practices” for American
corporations; (5) shareholder demand from the social investment sector;
(6) shareholder demand in the form of shareholder proposals; (7) the
imposition of governance changes in the settlement of securities class
actions or SEC enforcement litigation; and (8) norm entrepreneurship by
corporate CEOs.25

22

See FORD MOTOR CO., PROXY STATEMENT, available at http://www.ford.com/
microsites/proxy-statements; Coca Cola Enter., Inc., Committee Charter, available at
http://ir.cokecce.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=117435&p=irolgovCommittee&Committee=846.
23
See infra, Part I.
24
See infra, Part II.
25
See infra, Part III.
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I. BOARD-LEVEL SUSTAINABILITY COMMITTEES IN 2010
The decision to create a sustainability committee, like the decision to
create any board-level committee, represents a deliberate choice about the
optimal use of directors’ time and energy. An increasing (though still
minute) portion of the United States corporate universe is now deciding
that sustainability committees are a necessary component of their
corporate governance structure.
A. Committee Charters and Goals
Sustainability committee charters vary and are currently evolving.
Some companies, like Ford Motor Co., are both transparent and specific in
their description of their committee’s objectives and tasks:
To fulfill its responsibilities and duties, the Sustainability
Committee shall:
(1) Assist management in the formulation and implementation of
policies, principles and practices to foster the sustainable growth of the
Company on a world-wide basis. “Sustainable Growth” means the
ability to meet the needs of present motor vehicle customers while
taking into account the needs of future generations. “Sustainable
Growth” shall also encompass a business model that creates value
consistent with the long-term preservation and enhancement of
financial, environmental and social capital.
(2) Assist management in the formulation and implementation of
policies, principles and practices to permit the Company to respond to
evolving public sentiment and government regulation in the area of
motor vehicle and stationary source emissions, especially in the area of
greenhouse gas emissions and fuel economy and CO2 regulation.
(3) Assist management in setting strategy, establishing goals and
integrating sustainability into the daily business activities across the
Company.
(4) Review on a continuing basis new and innovative technologies
that will permit the Company to achieve sustainable growth and
Company actions to protect those technologies.
(5) Review on a continuing basis partnerships and relationships,
both current and proposed, with customers and others that support the
Company's sustainable growth.
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(6) Review on a continuing basis the Company’s communication
and marketing strategies relating to sustainable growth.26

Other companies are, at best, obfuscatory in describing the goals of
their sustainability committees.27 Some, though not all, post their
committee charters on their websites.28
A recent survey by The Conference Board reveals an important feature
of many sustainability initiatives, including the creation of board-level
sustainability committees: many companies simply have no idea what they
mean by “sustainability.” That is, when asked “how does your company
define sustainability?” 32.4 percent of the respondents answered “we
avoid definitions and focus on actions.”29 Where that is the case, the work
of sustainability committees may cover a lot of ground. Or these
committees–with no goals to guide them–may achieve little of lasting
importance. One important task for researchers will be to track the
performance both of companies that define and articulate their
sustainability objectives and those companies that do not.
B. Expertise, Information, and Accountability
An inevitable issue with the creation of a new board-level committee
is identifying who among the directors has either the interest or the
expertise to be a useful committee member. Surely, some unwilling or
unsuitable directors have been conscripted.
A related issue is information flow to the committee members. The
2010 Conference Board survey found that directors’ primary source of
information to expand their knowledge of sustainability issues and to stay
26

FORD MOTOR CO., CHARTER OF THE SUSTAINABILITY COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD
DIRECTORS, available at http://www.ford.com/doc/corpgov_sustainability_committee
_charter.pdf.
27
See, e.g., CENTURY ALUMINUM CO, PROXY STATEMENT, available at http://
investor.shareholder.com/cenx/annuals.cfm (“The Health, Safety and Sustainability
committee (the HSS Committee) was formed in 2008 to assist the board with regard to
oversight of Century’s policies and management systems with respect to health, safety,
and sustainability matters.”).
28
See, e.g., SYSCO CORP., CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY COMMITTEE CHARTER,
available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/SYY/854834918x0x234923/ b50417
fe-221c-451e-82ced9894b229a83/Corporate_sustainability_committee_charter_Sept_
2008.pdf; PNM RESOURCES, PUBLIC POLICY AND SUSTAINABILITY COMMITTEE
CHARTER, available at http://www.pnmresources.com/investors/documentdisplay.cfm?
DocumentID =5604; PROLOGIS, SUSTAINABILITY COMMITTEE CHARTER, available at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/PLD/854844087x0x281671/49faa944-889d-4376
-a19a-d26944 87f0b7/SUSTAINABILITY _COMM ITTEE_CHARTER.pdf.
29
Tonello, supra note 5, at 9.
OF
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abreast of competitive developments is, as is the case with most other
corporate matters, reports from senior executives.30 This means directors
must either come to the committee with pre-existing knowledge, do their
own due diligence in developing expertise, or rely–perhaps excessively–
on what the CEO and senior executives tell them. We understand that, in
fact, directors rarely do independent due diligence: “[D]irectors almost
never avail themselves of those additional sources (including peercompany benchmarks, securities analyst reports, director education
programs, and outside consultants) that would enable them to critically
verify and analyze any internally produced information on these
matters.”31
Yet a third issue for new committees, apart from acquiring expertise, is
figuring out how to recognize failure and measure success. In the
Conference Board survey, 38.2 percent of respondents reported they “do
not currently have a system in place for measuring progress made in their
social and environmental activities and 32.4 percent do not assess the
impact of such activities on the organization’s financial performance.”32
Importantly, too, more than 60 percent of the survey’s respondents
reported “they do not embed sustainability-related metrics into their topexecutive compensation policy.”33
C. Effectiveness and Impact
Even where board-level sustainability committees have the right
people and give those people the right tools, these committees still may
fail to protect the company’s interests. A vivid example is BP, which
“appears to have done everything right” in assigning environmental issues
to its board of directors.34 The board-level Safety, Ethics, and
Environment Assurance Committee (SEEAC) was charged with ensuring
that BP met its goal of “no accidents, no harm to people, and no damage to
the environment.”35 Although it had reviewed critical reports on the safety
30

Id. at 7.
Id.
32
Id. at 10-11.
33
Id. at 11.
34
Geoff Colvin, Who’s to Blame at BP The Board, FORTUNE, July 28, 2010,
http://geoffcolvin.com/fortune_articles/article/whos-to-blame-at-bp-the-board/.
35
Id. The specific charge of the SEEAC Committee included (a) reviewing “the
processes adopted by the executive management to identify and mitigate significant nonfinancial risks and receive assurance that they are appropriate in design and effective in
implementation,” (b) “monitoring and obtaining assurance that the management or
mitigation of significant BP risks of a non-financial nature is appropriately addressed,”
(c) reviewing material to be placed before shareholder which address BP’s
31
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of BP’s projects, the SEEAC apparently ignored the message. That is, the
SEEAC was aware of pervasive safety problems throughout BP’s North
American operations and also was aware that the mechanisms for
informing the board of these problems were “dysfunctional.”36
We know now that the Committee’s efforts were wholly inadequate to
anticipate or avoid the human and financial calamity arising out of the
explosion on the Deepwater Horizon in April, 2010.37 In a shareholder’s
derivative action filed shortly after the explosion on the drilling platform,
plaintiffs described the directors’ conduct as follows:
Defendants’ gross mismanagement of BP has severely damaged what
was once a valuable corporate franchise. They have deliberately
refused to take steps necessary to ensure the Company’s compliance
with legally required safety rules and environmental safeguards, instead
preferring to risk the safety of BP’s workers and the well-being of their
families in the pursuit of increased profits.38…. The conduct of BPs
directors and officers complained of herein involves a knowing and
culpable violation of their fiduciary obligations, the absence of good
faith on their part, and a reckless disregard for their duties to the
Company and its shareholders which the directors and officers were
aware or should have been aware posed a risk of serious injury to the
Company.39

There are reasons, of course, for failures like this. Outside directors
work only part-time, are not provided staff, and often, even within the
board, face competing priorities. The second-tier committees–those
committees that deal with issues other than finance, governance,
succession, and high-profile crises–probably fall far down the board’s
agenda and may not command the face-time with the full board necessary

environmental, safety and ethical performance and making recommendations to the board
about their adoption and publication,” (d) “reviewing BP’s internal control systems as
they relate to non-financial risk,” and “reviewing reports on the group’s compliance with
its code of conduct and on the employee concerns programme.” BP ANNUAL REPORT
AND ACCOUNTS 77 (2009).
36
Colvin, supra note 34 (quoting the testimony of corporate governance activist
Robert A. G. Monks).
37
Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill is the Largest of its Kind,
Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at A14 (“The BP spill is by far the world's
largest accidental release of oil into marine waters….”).
38
Complaint at 5 ¶ 11, Pickett v. Hayward, No. 9809041 (Alaska Ct. App. May 20,
2010) (verified shareholder derivative complaint for intentional and negligent breach of
fiduciary duty, abuse of control, and mismanagement).
39
Id. at 16-17 ¶ 43.
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to achieve the committees’ goals. The members of these committees may
also, like any group, fall prey to group-think.40
D. Corporate Resistance to Sustainability Committees
It is curious, perhaps, that while some American companies are
voluntarily creating board-level sustainability committees, others are
fiercely resisting doing so. At Apple, Inc., for example, the 2010 proxy
statement included a shareholder proposal that the company amend its
bylaws to establish a board-level Committee on Sustainability.41 Apple’s
management argued against adoption, in part because, according to Apple,
the company already was doing more than any other company in the
electronics industry to pursue sustainability goals.42 Intel successfully
opposed a similar proposal at its annual meeting in April, 2008.43
The Intel story, however, gets more interesting. In 2010, “under
pressure from activist investors,” Intel announced that it had altered its
corporate governance structure.44
Specifically, as of March 10, 2010, Intel’s corporate governance and
nominating committee charter requires that the committee “…
review(s) and report(s) to the Board on a periodic basis with regard to
matters of corporate responsibility and sustainability performance,
including potential long and short term trends and impacts to our
business of environmental, social and governance issues, including the
company's public reporting on these topics.”45

The emergence of sustainability committees, incidentally, has given
rise to a predictable form of entrepreneurship. For instance, one distancelearning website now promises to “certify” members for sustainability
committees for only $397.46

40

See Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1233 (2003) (discussing the perils of groupthink and its role in the
Enron debacle).
41
Apple Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 54 (Feb. 25, 2010) (Shareholder
Proposal No. 7), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/320193/0001193
12510013030/ddefr14a.htm.
42
Id. at 54-55.
43
Ambrose McNevin, Intel Rejects Call for Sustainability Committee, THE INQUIRER, Apr. 2, 2008, http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/1004991/intel-rejects-call.
44
Tonello, supra note 5, at 17.
45
Id.
46
Distance Learning Online Certification Program, Certified Member of the
Corporate Sustainability Committee of the Board of Directors, http://www.members-of-
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II. WHY SUSTAINABILITY COMMITTEES MIGHT MATTER
Notwithstanding the recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court in the Citizens United case,47 corporations have limited means of
self-expression. One way a corporation can speak, however, is through its
allocation of resources; particularly the limited resources of its outside
directors. When a company assigns responsibility, say, for approving
charitable contributions or political donations to a board-level governance
committee, it is saying something about its institutional values and the
board’s willingness to be held accountable for controversial corporate
decisions.48 When a company establishes a board-level risk management
committee, it is saying much the same thing: we take risk seriously, we
have escalated it to the board level in order to maximize the attention and
oversight that is given to the topic, and we want to centralize and
professionalize this oversight rather than diffusing it across the entire
board.49
Choosing to create a sustainability committee (or a committee with
comparable purposes but a different name) also sends a message. Indeed,
the creation of such a committee is a signaling device that sustainability is
a corporate priority. Creating a sustainability committee provides (some)
evidence that a company is committed to performance that goes beyond
mere compliance with existing and projected environmental laws. It can
and does add flesh to those (ubiquitous) corporate mission statements that
identify sustainability as one of a company’s key objectives.
The creation of a sustainability committee–indeed the creation of any
board-level committee–reflects the belief that that its members will
develop and employ valuable competencies: knowledge of the larger
environment in which the subject matter is situated and knowledge
regarding issues the company may face (for example, sustainable
manufacturing practices or preparedness for climate change) that the full
board may lack; knowledge of the technologies required to achieve
sustainability goals; knowledge of the language and metrics by which
sustainability is assessed; a sense of the range of possible short-term and
the-boardassociation.com/Distance_Learning_for_the_Sustainability_Committee_
of_the_Board.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
47
See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct 876 (2010).
48
See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy, Executives’ Pet Charities, and the
Agency Problem, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1147, 1150 (1997) (advocating that corporate
philanthropy be made a board-level agenda item).
49
See generally E. William Bates, II & Robert J. Leclerc, Boards of Directors and
Risk Committees, 17 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADVISOR. 15 (2009) (considering the
ramifications of risk committees).
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long-term sustainability goals and (at least in general) the pathways
necessary to achieve those goals; an understanding of the resources and
competencies currently within the company that can advance sustainability
goals; an understanding of the company-specific levers required to
activate people and resources; and a company-specific ability to move
ideas and proposals through the chain of command.
As we have seen, many of these competencies are still missing on
corporate environmental committees.50 Still, a well-functioning
committee, led by a competent chair, can with effort achieve many, if not
all, of the objectives for which the committee was created.
Beyond developing board-level expertise, there may be other benefits
that arise from the creation of a sustainability committee. First, a
sustainability committee (like any other special subject committee) is
likely to be more “nimble” than the whole board in identifying trends and
events.51 Second, a committee may foster cross-committee synergies–a
director who serves simultaneously on the Governance Committee and the
Sustainability Committee, for example, may see the dynamics of CEO
succession in a different light than others who lack the dual committee
experience.52
Third, sustainability committees offer a particularly good opportunity
for the exercise of the “advising” function by outside directors.53 When
serving on a sustainability committee, outside directors may import good
ideas that have not bubbled up internally, but nevertheless may be ripe for
exploitation within the company. In other words, outside directors
working from the platform of a sustainability committee may prove
influential in urging the company to “gear up” for sustainability
initiatives.54
50

See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
Bates & Leclerc, supra note 49, at 16.
52
Id. (noting the synergistic potential of membership on a board-level risk
management committee).
53
See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law,
Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO.
L.J. 797, 801-03 (2001) (articulating the three well-recognized board functions:
monitoring, legitimizing, and advising).
54
This wonderful metaphor derives from the automotive industry:
The framework’s first gear denotes compliance. In this first stage, a
firm views the business case for sustainability with skepticism and,
aside from generic corporate philanthropy, does little beyond comply
with applicable labor and environmental regulations. In second gear,
firms voluntarily move beyond mere compliance, view sustainability as
legitimate though mostly a public-relations matter, and focus their
efforts on “eco-efficiency” and “measuring, managing, and reducing”
the direct impact of their operations. Companies that shift into third
51
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Fourth, sustainability committees might serve to create a ripple effect–
when a director is appointed to such a committee at Company A, and
embraces its mission, she soon may become a champion of sustainability
at Companies B, C, and D. Betsy Atkins may be one such example. She
currently sits on the boards of four public companies.55 She recently wrote
a first-person commentary arguing that “[i]t has become obvious to every
board member today that environmental issues are now a factor in
governance decisions.”56 She learned this lesson in her board service at
SunPower Corp., a manufacturer of solar generating equipment.57 Perhaps
now she will carry that message to Chico’s (apparel), Polycom
(communications equipment), and Reynolds American (tobacco).58
Of course, there also may be some downsides to the creation of a
sustainability committee. Every additional committee increases the burden
on directors and spreads ever more thinly the time they are likely to devote
to their board duties. Creation of a special-purpose committee also may
unburden directors who are not on the committee from thinking deeply, or
at all, about the issues that are not in their immediate portfolio.
Balkanizing the board, in other words, may make the majority of directors
less rather than more attentive to sustainability issues.
As a related matter, creating a sustainability committee may also form
the basis for unwarranted confidence on the part of stakeholders that
environmental matters are receiving adequate attention. Sustainability
gear are more proactive in their efforts, often partnering with the
government as well as “suppliers, customers, and others in their
industry” to innovate sustainable solutions together. By fourth gear, a
firm has integrated sustainability principles into its strategy and
business processes (starting with product or service development),
putting the firm at a competitive advantage in its sector and at the same
time creating value for all of its stakeholder groups. In the fifth and
highest gear, companies redesign or “reengineer” their business
models, financial institutions, and markets to root out underlying
causes of nonsustainability at “macro” (planetary ecological limits),
“meso” (human-consumption demands), and “micro” (industry and
company) levels. To be sure, “for many people, most of the time, four
gears is enough, but there are times when it is necessary to shift into
fifth gear, or overdrive.”
Judd F. Sneirson, Green is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New
Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 993-94 (2009).
55
Committee Composition, Betsy S. Atkins, Director, SUNPOWER, http://investors.
sunpowercorp.com/committees.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
56
Betsy S. Atkins, How SunPower Builds “Green” Issues into its Corporate
Governance, 18 CORP.. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 1, 21 (2010).
57
Id.
58
Committee Composition, supra note 55.
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committees, as in the case of BP, may lull stakeholders into a false sense
of security.59
III. WHAT MIGHT DRIVE THE CREATION OF MORE BOARD LEVEL
SUSTAINABILITY COMMITTEES?
Currently, only a handful of American companies have created boardlevel sustainability committees.60 If there is to be a drumbeat for the
creation of more board-level committees, it will have to start somewhere.
Who or what is likely to be the catalyst for change?
A. State and Federal Law, NYSE Listing Standards
Under applicable state law, U.S. corporations (with exceptions for
closely-held enterprises), must have a board of directors;61 committees are
optional.62 Under federal law, public companies must have only a boardlevel audit committee.63 As of July, 2011, they also will have to have a
fully independent compensation committee.64 The New York Stock
Exchange’s listing standards require that boards have not only an audit
committee and a compensation committee, but also a nominating/
corporate governance committee (these are known collectively as the “big
three”).65 Otherwise, the use of committees is optional.
As a practical matter, state law is an unlikely driver for any change in
this setup. Typically, state corporate laws are enabling, not directive, and
Delaware is certainly unlikely to deviate from this approach. Federal
statutory law, too, is an unlikely driver. With a few notable exceptions,
U.S. federal law is aimed at disclosure and not at corporate governance
details. Recall, for example, that when Congress attempted to micromanage some aspects of corporate governance in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, Delaware legislators, judges, lawyers, and corporate leaders

59

See Robertson & Krauss, supra note 37.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
61
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2002).
62
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.25 (2002).
63
SEC Rule 10A-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b) (2010).
64
Mary E. Alcock, et al., Not Just Financial Reform: Dodd-Frank’s Executive
Compensation and Governance Requirements, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 1, 5
(2010).
65
FINAL NYSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES § 4, available at http://www.
nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf.
60
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famously rebelled.66 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, passed in July, 2010, does little to change this situation.67
The New York Stock Exchange is an unlikely driver, as well. True, the
Stock Exchange has mandated the “big three” committees for the boards
of its listed companies, but beyond that, the NYSE insists that, when it
comes to corporate governance practices, one size does not fit all.68
Indeed, the NYSE has encouraged a great deal of experimentation through
the use of company-specific corporate governance guidelines.69 As a
competitor with NASDAQ, the Stock Exchange would have little to gain
by further prescribing the organizational structure of companies whose
listings it seeks.
B. “Soft Law” and Norms
Who or what else might drive the development of sustainability
committees? What about the “best practices” community? Mainstream
actors like the Council of Institutional Investors, CalPERS, and the
Business Roundtable, and the for-profit advisors that make up the
“corporate governance industry” 70 all support the use of the “big three”
committees.71 They are unlikely, however, to agree on the need to create
additional special-interest board-level committees.
On the other hand, leading social investment funds like Domini or
widely-followed indices like the Dow Jones Sustainability Index or the
FTSE4Good Index might well add to their screening criteria the
establishment of board-level sustainability committees. Recently, for
66

See, e.g., Myron T. Steele, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware Perspective, 52 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 503 (Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Myron T. Steel makes the case
against Sarbanes-Oxley from Delaware’s perspective).
67
See Paul Rose, Regulating Risk by ‘Strengthening Corporate Governance’ 1, 2526 (June 25, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1630122 (arguing that the major corporate
governance mandates in the bill do little to change the status quo of corporate
governance) .
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FINAL NYSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES, supra note 65, at § 9 (“No single
set of guidelines would be appropriate for every company ….”).
69
Id.
70
See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 896
(2007).
71
See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES
§ 2.5 (“Companies should have audit, nominating and compensation committees, and all
members of these committees should be independent.”); CALPERS, GLOBAL PRINCIPLES
OF ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE III.B.2 § 1.8 (2010) (“Independent Board
Committees: Committees who perform the audit, director nomination and executive
compensation functions should consist entirely of independent directors.”); BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § III (2010).

2011]

AT THE INTERSECTION

223

example, CERES recommended that some financial institutions elevate
consideration of climate change issues to the board level.72 Others could
follow CERES’s lead.
C. Shareholder Demand
Still other possible drivers for governance change might surface, on a
corporation-specific basis. First, shareholders of individual companies
may advance shareholder proposals under SEC Rule 14a-8, as they did in
the cases of Apple and Intel.73 Similar proposals advancing sustainability
goals by means of systematic reporting, specific project objectives, and
adherence to the standards of groups such as the Forest Stewardship
Council are now commonplace during proxy season, though rarely
successful.74 Second, it is now possible for shareholders not only to
advance advisory proposals under Rule 14a-8 but also to advance binding
by-law amendments.75
Third, plaintiffs’ class action lawyers may use their leverage in settling
securities class actions to impose governance changes, including the
creation of new board-level committees, as one of the terms of a class
action settlement.76 These kinds of settlements are attractive both to
corporate leaders (who must do little to change their behavior) and also to
plaintiffs’ lawyers (who are ensured the recovery of a fee).

72

See DOUG COGAN, MEGAN GOOD & EMILY MCATEER, CERES, ADDRESSING
CLIMATE RISK: FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN EMERGING MARKETS: A BEST PRACTICES
REPORT (2009), available at http://www.ceres.org/Document.Doc?id=496.
73
See supra notes 41 and 44 and accompanying text.
74
Rule 14a-8 has recently been used to promote sustainability goals at: SunTrust
Banks, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 59-60 (Mar. 5, 2010); PPG Industries, Inc.,
PPG Industries, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 10-11 (Mar. 5, 2010); EOG
Resources, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 61-62 (Mar. 25, 2010); Tyson Foods,
Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 21-23 (Dec. 22, 2009), ONEOK, Inc., Proxy
Statement (Schedule 14A) 42-43 (Mar. 28, 2008); Kimberly-Clark Corp., Proxy
Statement (Schedule 14A) 48-50 (Mar. 14, 2007); and Kroger Co., Proxy Statement
(Schedule 14A) 43-44 (May 15, 2006), among others. There have been many shareholder
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See Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 462 F.3d 121,
123 (2d Cir. 2006).
76
See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1749, 1749 (2010) (identifying the specific terms of recent securities class action
settlements); Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics, supra note 1, at n.2 (enumerating
examples of governance changes extracted by plaintiffs’ lawyers in class action
settlements).

224

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:207

D. Negotiated Regulation Resulting from Civil and Criminal Enforcement
Proceedings
Plaintiffs’ class action lawyers are not the only advocates who can
demand alterations in corporate governance practices. The Securities and
Exchange Commission has also used its powers to create new board-level
committees when settling civil enforcement actions.77 Presumably, the
Environmental Protection Agency or the Department of Justice could also
extract such governance changes in settling lawsuits arising out of
violation of the environmental laws.78
E. Norm Entrepreneurs
Finally, some corporations may be influenced by the personal
preferences and initiatives of a powerful CEO. Charles O. “Chad”
Holliday was such a leader. As chairman and CEO of the chemical giant
DuPont from 1998-2009,79 Holliday also chaired the Business
Roundtable’s Task Force on Environment, Technology, and Economy.80
He co-authored the book Walking the Talk, which advocates social
responsibility and environmental stewardship by major industrial
companies.81 He is credited with “transforming DuPont from a fossil fuels
and chemical company to a science company, delivering sustainable
solutions that help others reduce their environmental footprints.”82
77

See Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics, supra note 1, at 795-96 (detailing the terms
of SEC settlements requiring changes in corporate governance practices and establishing
the creation of new board-level committees).
78
See Joseph G. Block & David L. Feinberg, Look Before You Leap: DPAs, NPAs
and the Environmental Criminal Case, ALI-ABA BUS. L. COURSE MATERIALS J. 7, 9
(2010), available at http://www.venable.com/files/Publication/4307e686-a055-41ca9150-b2ccf
d550365/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/83ca143f-8819-4478-8422b8203 40fa10d/ CMJ1002-Block_Feinberg.pdf.
79
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Holliday, Jr., 61, Chair, will retire from the board after 11 years as its chairman….Holliday served as DuPont’s CEO for 10 years.”).
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Throughout his tenure as CEO, his board included an Environmental
Policy Committee.83
There is a lesson here. At the end of the day, a commitment to
sustainability, with or without the creation of sustainability committees, is
unlikely to be achieved merely because shareholders or stakeholders want
it. Rather, as in all governance matters, this commitment is likely to
depend on the “moral conscience and self-interest of corporations’
leaders.”84
CONCLUSION
There is, of course, nothing magically transformative about the
creation of a board-level sustainability committee. Cosmetic committees
that sound good, but achieve little, litter the corporate landscape.
Still, the mini-trend that we can now observe, with the embrace by a
few U.S. companies of new language, new board-level commitments, and
new corporate structures, may be a leading indicator (a “green shoot”) of
things to come. As the sample size grows, it will be useful to see if
companies that have adopted board-level sustainability committees
outperform their peers either in sustainability performance or financial
performance. It will also be intriguing to see if, over the next decade, these
committees proliferate or evaporate.
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